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The publication of the Report of the Cohen Committee on
Company Law Amendment is one of those outstanding
events that is certain to leave its mark indelibly on the
history of company law . . . [The Accountant, 28 July
1945, p.42].
INTRODUCTION
The British limited liability company, formed by registration under the companies acts, was created in 1855. Although
the decades around the middle of the 19th century saw “the high
tide of laissez-faire” [Taylor, 1972, p.16], they also saw a marked
increase in state intervention in certain areas. Whereas the “industrial sphere” was broadly left to “the will of the manufacturers and the abstract laws of political economy” [Fay, 1937,
p.368], a measure of paternalistic control by the state was increasingly considered desirable in certain areas, particularly social administration. Spheres that were the subject of regulation
include provision for the poor, safety at work, employment practices, policing, public health and education [Conway, 1990,
p.71]. It was also a period that saw steps taken to require statutory accountability from many entities where, in today’s parlance, there existed “a legitimate demand for the information
that its financial statements would provide” [Accounting Standards Board, 1999, p.113]. These included: companies formed to
run railways, public utilities and financial institutions [Parker,
1990]; local government bodies such as municipal corporations
and county and district councils [Coombs and Edwards, 1996];
and mutual associations in the form of friendly societies, building societies and industrial and provident societies [Edwards
and Chandler, 2001].
The limited liability company remained substantially free
from corresponding statutory intervention. Whereas the newlycreated “registered” joint stock company had been subjected to
the requirement to publish an audited balance sheet in 1844,
these provisions were swept away twelve years later for reasons
that remain unclear. While it is true that the obligation to
present an audited balance sheet to the annual general meeting
was revived in 1900, there persisted, for almost a century, “the
liberal ideologies which had generated the formative companies
legislation of the 1850s” [Walker, 1996, p.320; also Stewart,
1991, p.49]. The enduring nature of that philosophy is revealed
in the following extract taken from the Report of the Company
Law Amendment Committee, 1926:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss2/4
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The system of company law and practice in force in
England and Scotland has been gradually evolved to
meet the needs of the community at large and the commercial community in particular. . . . It is a system well
understood by those who have to deal with it, it has
stood the test of years, and in our opinion should not be
altered in any matter of principle except where alteration
is imperatively demanded [emphasis added, quoted in
Edwards, 1980, p.79].
The ensuing Companies Act, 1929 (CA29) was consistent
with these sentiments, and it was therefore at a time when statutory accounting requirements were minimal – the early 1940s –
that the accounting profession began to assume a degree of formal responsibility for corporate financial reporting practices.
The largest British accountancy body at that time, the Institute
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), had
traditionally taken the view that the form and content of accounts were matters for shareholders and directors, with any
intervention from auditors prompted by professional judgment
rather than as the consequence of ICAEW fiat [Bircher, 1991,
p.233]. From 1942, however, the Council of the ICAEW began to
issue the famous series of Recommendations on Accounting
Principles (RoAPs) (forerunners of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice) to serve as practical guidelines on financial
reporting “for the information of members” [The Accountant, 12
December 1942, p.354]. According to a leading accountant of
the day, RoAPs, which were based on procedures that were
widely deemed to represent best practice, “met with a remarkable degree of acceptance not only from members of the profession but, what was even more striking, from directors of companies and their advisers. The consequent impact on the standards
of accounting in the country was little short of tremendous”
[quoted in Zeff, 1972, p.23]. Twenty-nine RoAPs were issued
between 1942 and 1969 (Appendix 1). The substantive provisions of those issued early were incorporated by the state in the
Companies Act, 1947.
This paper employs the concept of corporatism to improve
our understanding of how the relationship between the ICAEW
and the state affected the content of RoAPs issued by the
ICAEW and subsequently enshrined in Companies Act, 1947.
The paper therefore aims to add to a literature that has employed a corporatist framework to study accounting regulation
in different countries [Puxty et al, 1987; Willmott et al, 1992]
and, more germane to our own work, to achieve a better underPublished by eGrove, 2004
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standing of the relationship between the profession and the state
in a particular geographic locale [Cooper et al., 1989;
Richardson, 1989; Chua and Poullaos, 1993; Walker and
Shackleton, 1995 and 1998; Stoddard, 2000; Rodrigues et al,
2003].
PRIOR LITERATURE
The Companies Act, 1947 (CA47) represented a break with
prior liberal ideology. It significantly expanded statutory disclosure requirements by introducing provisions for filing with the
Registrar of Companies and presenting to shareholders an audited balance sheet and profit and loss account containing fairly
detailed accounting information. The reforms of CA47 have thus
been interpreted as significant in achieving the disclosure of
relevant and effective information for investor decision-making
[Board of Trade, 1945, pp.7-8; Edey, 1950, p.308; Ryan, 1967,
pp.95-97; Baxt, 1968, pp.301-306]. The new Act was founded on
reforms recommended by the Company Law Amendment Committee, chaired by Mr. Justice Cohen (the Cohen Committee),1
that were submitted to the President of the Board of Trade
(BoT) in June 1945.2 The Bill drafted by the BoT was presented
to Parliament in June 1947 and passed comparatively non-controversially into law in August 1947 [The Accountant, 4 October
1947, p.209].3 British company law was consolidated in June of
the following year as the Companies Act, 1948 (CA48).
The leading professional accounting journal of the day commented as follows on the relationship between the accounting
recommendations contained in the Cohen Committee’s report
and the memorandum of evidence submitted in February 1944

1
The “Introductory” section sets out, in paragraph 5, the Committee’s basic
philosophy: “[t]he Companies Acts have been amended from time to time to
bring them into accord with changing conditions, but if there is to be any
flexibility opportunities for abuse will inevitably exist. We consider that the
fullest practicable disclosure of information concerning the activities of companies will lessen such opportunities and accord with a wakening social consciousness . . . We have included a number of proposals to ensure that as much information as is reasonably required shall be made available both to the
shareholders and creditors of the companies concerned and to the general public” [Board of Trade, 1945, pp.7-8, emphasis added].
2
A chronology of key events is contained in Appendix 2.
3
Some features of the new Companies Bill were amended by the House of
Lords [Bircher, 1991, p.267]. The changes were principally designed to simplify
the planned regulations relating to group accounts, and the outcome was to
produce a statutory requirement more closely aligned to the content of RoAP 7.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss2/4
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by the Council of the ICAEW: “chartered accountants had every
reason to congratulate themselves on the detailed terms of the
[Cohen Committee’s] Report because throughout its very extended length it adopted time and time again the substance of
the ICAEW evidence” [The Accountant, 28 July 1945, p.42]. Further, “the specific recommendations made as to the contents of
published accounts [by the Cohen Committee] conformed with
remarkable closeness to the points put forward by the representatives of the ICAEW” [The Accountant, 18 August 1945, p.78].
The idea that the ICAEW was instrumental in bringing
about the radical accounting content of CA48 has been accepted
by accounting historians. For example, Bircher [1991, p.293]
concludes that “[t]he form and content of CA48 owes much to
the ICAEW’s development of its reform programme and the exercise of its influence to mould the legislation in the form of its
own programme” (emphasis added). Maltby [2000, p.35] interprets the legislation as “a successful attempt by the accounting
profession to retain jurisdiction over accounting disclosure”.
The important prior event consistent with these inferences is the
advance publication by the ICAEW (starting December 1942) of
its series of RoAPs. According to Bircher, RoAPs established the
ICAEW, in the eyes of government, as the only accountancy
association with direct practical experience of accounting regulation [Bircher, 1991, pp.231-232, also p.260]. The memorandum submitted to Cohen, drawing on the content of RoAPs, was
considered by the BoT and by Parliament as a professionally
well-informed review of what was feasible in regulatory terms
[Bircher, 1991, p.281]. This linkage between RoAPs, the ICAEW
memorandum to Cohen and subsequent legislation is accepted
by other writers:
Much of the contents of the first eight Recommendations [published from December 1942 to July 1944]
eventually found expression in the 1945 Report of the
Cohen Committee and in the revised Companies Act
itself [Zeff, 1972, p.16].
Indeed, in framing its recommendations, the [Cohen]
committee drew heavily on the ICAEW’s submission
which was, in turn, based on the Recommendations issued through its Taxation and Financial Relations Committee, beginning in 1942. The [Cohen] committee’s
recognition of the prime position of the ICAEW in
bringing about improvements in financial reporting
procedures, and its willingness to provide a back-up
system in the form of statutory support for RecommenPublished by eGrove, 2004
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dations which had proved successful, undoubtedly improved the status of each of these [Edwards, 1989,
p.209].
The early recommendations of the ICAEW formed the
basis of the sweeping reforms in the accounting requirements which were recommended by the Cohen
Committee on Company Law Amendment [Stewart,
1991, p.43].
The purpose of this study is to re-examine the view that the
ICAEW, through the content of the series of Recommendations
that it developed and then incorporated into its memorandum
submitted to the Cohen Committee, molded the radical accounting provisions contained in CA48 in the form of its own
programme. It is argued that
(1) the BoT, through the formation of the Cohen Committee, prompted the qualitative change that occurred in the content of RoAPs 6-10, issued by the ICAEW, that were drafted to
accord with the content of its submission to the Cohen Committee, and
(2) before the ICAEW memorandum was submitted to the
Cohen Committee in February 1944, a corporatist structure is
discernible in the relationship between the BoT and the ICAEW
causing the leaders of the ICAEW to align its interests with the
BoT’s priorities for the amendment of company law.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. First, we
explore aspects of corporatist theory to provide an analytical
framework for understanding the relationship between the
ICAEW and the BoT. The attitude of the ICAEW’s Council towards corporate accounting disclosure pre-Cohen is next considered, and the reason for the emergence of the BoT’s specific
and autonomous interest in the amendment of company law is
then clarified. Then follows our analysis of the emergence of a
corporatist structure coloring the relationship between the BoT
and the ICAEW; a relationship that caused the latter to align the
memorandum submitted to the Cohen Committee with the
state’s priorities for the reform of company law. The significance
of the hierarchical structure that existed between the Council of
the ICAEW and the district societies, in preparing the ICAEW
memorandum for submission to the Cohen Committee, is next
demonstrated. The process of drafting RoAPs is reviewed, in
light of the above findings, to show that the content of the second five RoAPs was purposely designed to accord with the content of the ICAEW memorandum to Cohen.
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CORPORATISM
We have noted above the fact that Britain’s governments
largely abstained from intervention in industry and commerce
during the nineteenth century. This changed dramatically during the first half of the twentieth century [Tolliday, 1987, pp.
285-293; Wilson, 1995, p. 168; Hobsbawm, 1968, p. 242], and
this transformation is partly reflected in the fact that government expenditure as a proportion of gross national product rose
more than three-fold, from 12.7% to 39%, between 1910 and
1950. To help explain the relationship between the state and
organized interests, where there is a high level of state intervention, corporatist theory applicable to liberal democracies, or
neo-corporatism, began to be developed in the mid-1970s. The
first serious attempt to develop a substantial model of
corporatism as an institutional structure, and to reveal its theoretical relevance, was Schmitter’s well-known essay of 1974
which defines corporatism as:
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within
their respective categories in exchange for observing
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports [reproduced in
Schmitter, 1979, p.13].
Schmitter saw corporatism as an institutionally structured system of interest representation which operates in a manner that
restricts competition and openness among organized interests.
Central to the corporatist model is its recognition of “the state,
as opposed to government, as the key public actor in interest
group politics” [Williamson, 1989, p.121, emphasis in original].
This means that:
the wider state institutions such as the bureaucracy,
public enterprises and law enforcement agencies, are
not guided solely, if effectively at all, by the decisions of
democratically elected governments…This view assigns
major importance to the increasing institutional size
and complexity of the modern liberal state, such that it
is argued that it has become an organizationally powerful entity able to free itself of popular preferences or
class power, and thereby pursue its own autonomous
Published by eGrove, 2004
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institutional interests as determined by state elites
[Williamson, 1989, p.123].
Under corporatism, the state is thus seen as a powerful entity
able to pursue its own autonomous interests through its size,
complexity and bureaucratic processes.
If the behavior of organized groups poses a fundamental
challenge to the interests of the state, it seeks to change their
behavior. According to Cawson [1983, p. 179], where targets of
intervention are ‘interests constituted on the basis of their socioeconomic function’, as seen in the domain of economic management or industrial policy, ‘the intervention has to be purposiverational, this is justified in terms of effective results rather than
legitimate procedures’. If the state has difficulty in securing such
results by means of authoritative regulation, the intervention
into the socio-economic function requires the co-operation of
functional groups. Groups called ‘producers’, representing
sectoral business interests including professional and management interests, have fundamentally different resources of influence to wield from those of consumers or others; producers can
wield a range of sanctions (e. g., strikes, non-cooperation and
refusal of essential information) and specialized skills and
knowledge which raise serious obstacles to intervention by the
state [Cawson, 1985, p. 12]. The state, therefore, has to enter
into negotiations with producers in policy formulation, and to
reconcile tension and contradiction with such groups, to ensure
effective intervention [Williamson, 1989, p. 125].
A key feature of corporatism is, therefore, the switch from
the individualistic to the organizational level in negotiations for
the ordering of society, in which sectoral associations of business interests, called “producer associations”, play a decisive
part in deciding individual producers’ interests [Williamson,
1989, p.76]. Consequently, the individual producers’ priorities
are susceptible to redefinition and molding, in a possibly distorted form, by such associations.
Corporatist writers point to the fact that corporatism causes
producer associations to exhibit certain inter-related features
amongst which the following are of relevance to this study: a
dependence upon the state, founded on the attribution of public
status [Offe, 1981, pp.136-137]; and, a bureaucratically hierarchical structure “under the dominant influence of the leadership
rather than responsive to membership demands” [Williamson,
1989, p.75].
In exchange for some form of state recognition, producer

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss2/4
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associations necessarily surrender a degree of autonomy with
the consequential risk of being less able to respond to the interests of their members. As Williamson [1989, p.207] puts it:
“[t]here is an exchange whereby the state supports the organization in various ways in exchange for some constraint upon its
articulation of demands” on the state, which has a distorting
effect on the representational function of producer associations.
The role that producer associations need to play within
corporatism therefore has implications for the way in which
they are structured: “[t]he permanent staff . . . of such associations have to have specialist knowledge, exercise particular skills
and hold considerable information to be able to effectively negotiate” with the state [Williamson, 1989, p.80]. Streeck [1983,
pp.268-269, 281] adds that, to fulfill these roles, producer associations must acquire internal features that resemble the state’s
bureaucratically hierarchical structure.
A corporatist relationship with the state requires that an
association’s members are excluded from direct involvement in
negotiations and decision-making, which means that decisions
reached may not command widespread support from the membership. For negotiated arrangements to work, however, the
leadership of producer associations must have some means of
ensuring members’ compliance where their decisions do not
command widespread support [Williamson, 1989, pp.81-82].
Corporatist writers refer to the way in which events can be manipulated by the leadership [Schmitter, 1982, p.260; Crouch,
1983, p.458; Grant, 1985, pp.20-21], with Williamson [1989,
p.208] attaching particular emphasis to “the delimitation of the
opportunities for the members to oppose decisions taken by the
leadership” by controlling the flow of information within the
organization. As a result, leaders can make the decisions appear
to be in the self-interest of individual members [Sabel, 1981,
p.213].
Relevant to this study is the fact that professional associations possess, in many respects, the kind of institutional traits
that are identifiable within a corporatist structure. First, they
generally achieve an effective monopolistic position “in respect
of their right to exercise particular skills” based on a body of
specialist knowledge [Williamson, 1989, p.171]. Second, “members of a profession are licensed to carry out their occupation by
relevant professional associations” which are recognized in
some way by the state [Williamson, 1989, p. 172]. Third, the
associations “have to defend their position” and to maintain
necessary regulation over the behavior of members [Williamson,
Published by eGrove, 2004
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1989, p.172]. Finally, they claim to “act in an altruistic or publicregarding manner” in exchange for having a monopolistic position [Williamson, 1989, p.172].
The ICAEW was granted, on formation in 1880, exalted
public status through the award of a Royal Charter, which is the
most prestigious method of incorporation for a professional association because a Charter has “symbols or badges of honour
that allegedly signify exceptional virtues and trustworthiness in
the provision of specialist expertise” [Willmott, 1985, p.47]. In
the petition for a Charter, the ICAEW claimed that its formation
would serve the public benefit and, for that purpose, set forth
strict rules of conduct of members and relevant disciplinary procedure in the Bye-laws. As the result of licensing by Royal Charter, members were placed in a dominant position4 in the accountancy labor market in England and Wales. In 1941, the
ICAEW was the largest professional accounting association in
Britain. With 13,694 members, it accounted for 38.4% of the
total membership of the seven senior accounting bodies at that
time [Matthews et al, 1998, p.62]. In 1921, Ernest Cooper, a
former president of the ICAEW, stated that members of the
ICAEW “possess no monopoly, but . . . have charge of about 95%
of the auditing business of substantial concerns” [Ms. 28432/19].
In 1943, Lord Plender, President 1910-12 and 1929-30, boasted
that “I doubt if any material change in the percentage has taken
place since [1921]; if so, I fancy it would be favourable to us . . .
the Institute should show how great is its influence compared
with other bodies, quoting the percentage” [Ms. 28432/19]. Indeed, the first paragraph of the ICAEW memorandum to Cohen
stated that “[i]ts members are auditors of the large majority
(estimated at over 90%) of the public companies of which particulars are given in the Stock Exchange Official Yearbook” [Ms.
28432/19].
These conditions suggest that the corporatist framework
could be a useful way of analyzing the dialectical relationships
between the state authorities and the ICAEW, given its position
as the leading producer association within the accountancy profession.5 In the next but one section, we will further explore this
4
This situation persisted despite the fact that the growing market for accountancy labor promoted the formation of organizations for excluded practitioners. As at February 1930, for example, at least 17 accountancy bodies exited
[Stacey, 1954, p.138].
5
As revealed in the next but one section, there is no evidence to suggest that
the BoT, when selecting a suitable accountant for appointment to the Cohen
Committee, seriously considered choosing someone from outside the member-
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possibility through tracing the emergence of the state’s specific
and autonomous interests in the amendment of company law.
First, we consider the stance of the ICAEW’s Council on the
improvement of corporate financial reporting procedures prior
to the appointment of the Cohen Committee.
THE ICAEW AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTING
DISCLOSURE PRE-COHEN
The Council of the ICAEW had traditionally insisted that
the form and content of corporate published accounts were matters for agreement between shareholders and directors. Council
maintained that excessive disclosure in accounts was harmful to
the business interests of British firms as it entailed making
available valuable information to competitors. In 1925, when
the ICAEW, as a society representing professional accountants,
made its first submission to a BoT’s Company Law Amendment
Committee, it argued that “to attempt to prescribe either a statutory form of Balance Sheet or what a Balance Sheet must disclose or that there should be in addition a Profit and Loss Account is considered to do more harm than good”. Their overall
conclusion was unsympathetic and uncompromising: “[i]t is impossible by legislation to protect fools from their own folly”
[quoted in Edwards (ed.), 1980, p.120].
It is clear from comments made by its leaders in the aftermath of the Royal Mail case of 1931 [Edwards, 1976, p.299] that
the ICAEW had become more sympathetic to the need for improved corporate accountability, but it believed that the achievement of this objective did not require statutory intervention.6 In
1934, the ICAEW’s Council acknowledged the need for action by
ship of the chartered institutes, and the signs are that they expected the appointee to be a member of the ICAEW [BT58/356]. CA47 and CA48 nevertheless
introduced the so-called “auditor provision” which allowed auditors to be members of the ICAEW, the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, the
Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants, or the Scottish chartered
bodies or persons who were recognized as eligible by the BoT. Members of all
these bodies were therefore recognized under CA48, and the BoT established, in
October 1947, a consultative committee reflecting the interests of all these bodies, namely the Accountancy Advisory Committee [BT58/446, pp.116-118].
6
A persuasive explanation for the ICAEW’s antipathy towards legislative
regulation is contained in the following comment made by H. L. H. Hill, President 1931-32 and 1933-34: “I am thankful to believe that the time will never
come when legislation can be so definite and comprehensive that auditors will
be reduced to mere automata, to obey audit programmes laid down by statute.
The whole value of our work is dependent upon our proper exercise of judgement” [The Accountant, 9 January 1932, p.46].
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the business community to bring about a voluntary improvement in disclosure practices. A. E. Cutforth, President 1934-36,
voiced the following appeal to members attending the 1934 autumnal meeting of the ICAEW: “it is better that any desirable
reforms should come about voluntarily by an improvement in
general practice than that an attempt should be made to enforce
them by legislation” [The Accountant, 20 October 1934, p.545].
On 23rd January 1935, the Parliamentary and Law (P&L) Committee of the Council formed “a sub-committee to make preparations for future possible amendment of company law”
(SCCLR) [Ms. 28420/3, p.88].7 Cutforth advised the 55th annual
meeting of the ICAEW, held in May 1936, that:
it is within our knowledge that the [government] department concerned is watching the situation closely.
Sooner or later, no doubt, a Committee or Commission
will be set up to deal with company law amendment;
and bearing this in mind the Council has for some considerable time been collecting data and sifting opinions
through the medium of a special Committee in order
that when the occasion arises the Institute may be
ready with concrete and well-considered recommendations [The Accountant, 9 May 1936, p.722].
The fundamental stance that emphasized voluntary improvement of disclosure practices was retained, however, as
demonstrated in the address made by R. N. Carter, President
1936-37, to the 56th annual meeting in May 1937:
the Council have continued to collect information and
opinions on balance sheets and the audit of the accounts of limited companies in order that they may be
ready, when the time is ripe, to submit views on any
amendments to the Companies Act which may be considered necessary . . . the profession itself is directing
attention to more information being afforded both in
the balance sheet and in the profit and loss account. It
is probable that this can be better achieved in that way
than by legislation [The Accountant, 8 May 1937,
pp.663-664, emphasis added].
A report from the SCCLR was submitted to the P&L Committee on 25th July 1938, and its extensive proposals for greater
disclosure in published accounts are detailed by Bircher [1991,
7
Members of the SCCLR were: the Chairman of the P&L Committee (Sir
Henry McAuliffe); President (Cutforth); Vice-President (R. N. Carter); H. M.
Barton; W. Cash; H. L. H. Hill; and Sir Harold Howitt [Ms. 28420/3, p.88].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss2/4

12

atism and unavoidable imperatives: Recommendations on accounting principles and the ICAEW memoran
Noguchi and Edwards: Corporatism and Unavoidable Imperatives

65

pp.147-155]. Having reviewed its contents, Bircher [1991, p.156]
considers it “surprising that the ICAEW chose not to publish it
or even to express more favourable views on the possibility of
company law reform”. Elsewhere, however, we find Bircher
[1991, p.152] making observations that are consistent with our
interpretation of ICAEW’s actions in the 1940s and its developing relationship with the state:
this report is rather at odds with public statements by
ICAEW representatives that reform of accounting practice by legislation was not feasible. However, it is clear
from the report that by the middle of the 1930s there
was a private recognition by the ICAEW that reform by
legislation was possible (although not necessarily desirable).
The decision of the ICAEW’s Council to issue RoAPs, commencing in December 1942, may be interpreted as public recognition of the fact that it was possible for disclosure practices to
be prescribed in detail, and, by implication, that statutory regulation was a feasible proposition which would no longer “do
more harm than good” [ICAEW submission to the Company
Law Amendment Committee in 1925, quoted in Edwards, 1980,
p.120]. Even the RoAP programme did not, however, appear to
signify, at the outset, Council’s conversion to the need for legislative intervention. As revealed in the preamble to the first two
recommendations issued on 12th December 1942, RoAPs were
merely expected to “be helpful to members in advising directors
as to what is regarded as the best practice” [The Accountant, 12
December 1942, p. 354]. A transformation of the ICAEW’s traditional stance was made public soon afterwards, however, following the appointment of the Cohen Committee. As will be shown
in this paper, the Council of the ICAEW, through the submission
of its memorandum to the Cohen Committee, now recognized
that reform by legislation had become necessary, or at least
inevitable.
THE BOARD OF TRADE AND COMPANY LAW REFORM
The desire of the state to institute “a broad inquiry into the
basic principles underlying the company law” originated with
the bureaucrat, Sir Edward Hodgson, Second Secretary of the
BoT8 who submitted his ideas to Hugh Dalton, President of the
BoT 1942-45, on 22 December 1942:
8

Relevant government officials and their position are given in Appendix 3.
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The experience of the Department . . . strongly suggests
that the law should be strengthened to provide greater
publicity in regard to the formation and affairs of a
limited liability company and of better safeguards for
investors and shareholders. It may be doubted whether
existing company law sufficiently recognises modern
social trends in investments. The small investor, whose
numbers are now legion, is virtually a sleeping partner
with neither the wish nor the opportunity to undertake
any of the management responsibilities which underlie
the present legal conception of a shareholder, and he
therefore needs special protection [BT58/356].
In the 1930s, the BoT had been exposed to pressures to
reform company law from certain quarters, such as A. M.
Samuel, M. P., and Henry Morgan, President of the Society of
Incorporated Accountants and Auditors (SIAA) 1929-32 [BT146/
17]. The BoT had resisted such pressures, up until the end of
1942, for reasons that included: the lack of unanimity within the
accounting profession concerning the need for legislation
[Edwards, 1976, p.299];9 the observation that “it cannot yet be
considered that experience of the working of the present Act is
sufficient to ensure that amendment is necessary”; and because
“it is almost a truism that the practice of many companies and
auditors goes beyond the requirements of the law”.10 The radical
change of BoT policy in favor of company law reform, as revealed in Hodgson’s communication to Dalton, is, in Bircher’s
view [1988, p.117], best understood “as a reflection of the
changes in social attitudes stimulated” by World War II, which
brought about unprecedented mobilization and control over resources used by the state. According to Hancock and Gowing
[1949, p.541]:
There existed, so to speak, an implied contract between
Government and people; the people refused none of the
sacrifices that the Government demanded from them
for the winning of the war; in return, they expected that
the Government should show imagination and seriousness in preparing for the restoration and improvement
of the nation’s well-being when the war had been won.
The plans for reconstruction were, therefore, a real part
of the war effort.
9
Lord Plender was a particularly vociferous opponent of change in a series
of speeches made in 1932 [Bircher, 1991, pp.112-113].
10
Memorandum prepared by J. G. Henderson, Principal of the Companies
Department of the BoT [quoted in Bircher, 1988, p.113].
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In this atmosphere, Dalton prepared a memorandum, dated
15 February 1943, that urged enhanced transparency in the affairs of limited liability companies. The document expressed
concern that “the interests both of the public and of the [large
number of] small shareholder may be insufficiently safeguarded”. Dalton continued:
I am not satisfied that the existing framework of the
Company Law is altogether suited to modern needs . . .
Much will depend after the war, both for the nation and
for the individual, on ordered development and responsible conduct of limited liabilities companies . . . The
provisions with regard to private companies have, in
the experience of the Department, been gravely abused
and here again the question of reform needs urgent
consideration. There are other questions such as . . .
holding companies, subsidiaries companies, and the requirements in regard to the accounts of companies,
which call for enquiry. I propose, therefore, to set up at
once a small Committee under a strong independent
Chairman, to examine the principles of the Company
Law and to consider whether any major reforms are
necessary to provide better safeguards for the investor,
the shareholder and the public interest, and greater
publicity in regard to the formation and affairs of a
limited liability company; and, if so, to suggest what
they should be, so that a measure may be prepared for
introduction at the appropriate moment [BT58/356].
Dalton circulated his memorandum to Sir William Jowitt,
Minister for Reconstruction (1942-44), and Sir Kingsley Wood,
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1940-43), requesting support for
his initiative and suggesting that they collaborate to fix the
membership of the proposed committee [BT58/356]. Jowitt and
Wood responded enthusiastically, and the “autonomous” interest of the state in amending company law was firmly instituted.
The BoT’s departmental Committee on Company Law Amendment was appointed on 26th June 1943 with Mr. Justice Cohen
at the helm in response to Hodgson’s plea for “a strong chairman who would command universal confidence” (BT58/356).
In arranging the remaining membership of the Cohen Committee, the BoT “took care to include people who were likely to
be sympathetic to new ideas” [Edwards, 1989, p.207]. According
to Bircher [1988, p.117], “the principal battle for change in accounting practice had been won in the establishment of the
committee of inquiry”. As to the ideal qualifications for a suitable accountant to serve on the committee, a letter from Sir
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Arnold Overton, Permanent Secretary of the BoT, to Arthur F. B.
fforde, Deputy Director of Contracts at the Ministry of Supply,
dated 2 February 1943, listed the following attributes: “a really
first-class man . . . of the younger school . . . while not generally
known (necessarily) as a first-class man, regarded as such by
those best able to judge” [BT58/356]. In a reply dated 4 February
1943, fforde mentioned several names.11 Apart from Dowling
and Burleigh (both Scots), those listed were all members of the
ICAEW [BT58/356]. Two letters addressed to senior BoT officials favoring the appointment of Russell Kettle, of Deloittes,
proved decisive. One from a Treasury official to Dalton’s colleague, Hodgson, dated 29 January 1943, stated that:
Thinking over your request the other day for any Treasury suggestions of names of accountants who might
serve on your Advisory Committee on Company Law, I
find it a little difficult not to put Mr. Kettle first. It is
not very long since he was appointed our accountant
adviser, to help us on accountancy questions arising,
amongst other things, out of our war expenditure
[BT58/356].
Another letter, this time from Kingsley Wood to Dalton
dated 15 April 1943, stated that:
as regards an accountant, would you care to consider
Kettle of Deloitte’s, who is, of course, well known to
your Department. I gather that he was partly instrumental in starting up an unofficial committee of the
Institute to examine the question of the amendment of
the Company Law,12 and this might be a useful link. Of
his personal qualifications I need hardly speak [BT58/
356].
Kettle became heavily involved with drafting the accounting
recommendations of the report of the Cohen Committee and,
afterwards, the corresponding provisions to be incorporated in
the Companies Bill, 1946. Indeed, Kettle, together with T. B.
Robson, were described as the BoT’s “advisers in the drafting
and during the passage of the Companies Bill” [BT58/446,
11
Those named were: Sir Harold Howitt, H. M. Barton, H. A. Benson, T. B.
Robson, J. T. Dowling, J. C. Burleigh and G. D. Shepherd.
12
The reconstituted SCCLR, as described below.
13
Kettle received a knighthood in 1947 in recognition of his work as a
member of the Cohen Committee and for advising the government when drafting the consequential legislation [Kettle, 1957, p.138]. At approximately 56 years
of age, Kettle was hardly a young man, but it is perhaps the case that reference
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p.117].13 In the next two sections, we consider the extent to
which corporatist structures were utilized by the leaders of the
ICAEW in formulating its submission to the Cohen Committee.
BUILDING A CORPORATIST STRUCTURE:
THE ROLE OF THE RECONSTITUTED SCCLR
From the 1880s onwards there were recurring attempts to
achieve state recognition for some or all qualified accountants
as monopoly suppliers of accounting services. Walker and
Shackleton [1995] employ a corporatist framework to analyze
initiatives in the period 1930-1957, and show that a key episode
was the formation, in 1942, of a Co-ordinating Committee, comprising delegates from the councils of the major accounting bodies. The object was to secure, through licensing, “a legal monopoly of public practice” for their members [Walker and
Shackleton, 1995, p.467]. The initial approach to the Minister
for Reconstruction, Sir William Jowitt, was made by R. W.
Bankes, Secretary of the ICAEW, on 7th July 1942, to discuss
the general question of post-war reconstruction. The first meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee was held on 7 August 1942.
This was followed, in September of that year, by a meeting between the minister and representatives of the ICAEW. At the
next meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee held on 5th October 1942, C. J. G. Palmour, President of the ICAEW 1938-44,
reported that Jowitt had stated that “the Accountancy bodies
should get together and form some scheme for the co-ordination
of the profession” [Ms. 28428, p.3]. The ICAEW delegates continued to play the leading role in this ultimately flawed initiative
[Walker and Shackleton, 1995, pp.486-496], starting work on
drafting a Public Accountants’ Bill on 24th October 1942. We
conclude that the decision to mount the co-ordination initiative,
at the same time that the BoT was revealing its determination to
achieve a radical reform of company law, may have been a factor that encouraged the leaders of the ICAEW, in their submission to Cohen, to align the ICAEW’s interests with those of the
state.14 This is consistent with one of the central features of a
to “younger school” was intended to rule out leading accountants such as
Kettle’s senior colleague, Lord Plender (81 years old when the Cohen Committee
was appointed), who had steadfastly favored a policy of non-intervention.
14
We acknowledge the difference between the nature of the producer association seeking a corporate relationship with the state in relation to the coordination initiative and that seeking one in relation to the reform of company
law. Whereas the relevant producer association, in the latter case, was the
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corporatist structure, by revealing a producer association’s dependence upon the state based on the attribution of public status.
The preparation of the ICAEW’s submission to the Cohen
Committee was the responsibility of the P&L Committee whose
key role within the ICAEW’s organizational structure, at this
time, can be inferred from its membership profile. This included, besides the current President, all five past Presidents
remaining on Council as at 29th March 1943 (Appendix 4). No
other committee had so many past Presidents. A further characteristic of the P&L Committee was that members were partners
in leading London accountancy firms.15 It was likely to be the
case that partners in the large London firms were best known
throughout commerce and industry. It was certainly the case
that they were the accountants well known to government departments. The relationship between the state and accountants
had accelerated during World War I when many accountants
were called upon to supply their specialist expertise in support
of the war effort. It blossomed during the inter-war period when
numerous accountants were engaged to help reconstruct and
reorganize British industry [Matthews et al, 1998, pp.151-159].
The participation of accountants in government affairs achieved
further impetus during World War II with their recruitment to
the many new and expanded departments that resulted from
renewed wartime intervention in industry [Howitt, 1966,
pp.253-256; Garrett, 1961, pp.210-214; Parker, 1980].
To help prepare a memorandum for submission to Cohen,
the P&L Committee reconstituted the SCCLR at a meeting held
ICAEW, it was the Co-ordinating Committee comprising the major accountancy
bodies who sought state preferment as the monopolistic supplier of accounting
services. However, as noted above, the ICAEW was the leading professional
accounting body and its delegates played the dominant role on the Coordinating Committee. Indeed, it is likely that the ICAEW’s leaders included
other accountancy societies in the discussions, because, as implied by the comment attributed to Jowitt, it would otherwise have been impossible to obtain
state approval for the desired monopoly position.
15
From the Companies Act, 1862 through to the Companies Act, 1967, there
existed a provision prohibiting partnerships of more than 20 members. The
number of qualified accountants employed in accountancy firms, rather than
the number of partners, is considered to be a better indication of size. The
average number of accountants employed in 1939 by firms whose partners were
members of the Council was 17.5 per firm, whereas for members of the P&L
Committee the corresponding figure was 37.5 per firm. In addition, the seven
largest firms out of 54 firms that had at least one partner on Council in 1939
were also represented on the P&L Committee.
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on 29th March 1943.16 In the remainder of this section, we
explain how the leaders of the ICAEW ensured that the reconstructed SCCLR included people sympathetic to the
government’s conversion to the need for a radical revision of
company law and, thus, would be capable of enhancing the desired corporatist relationship with the state.
The characteristics of the P&L Committee, described above,
were broadly replicated in the membership of the SCCLR17 with
only Cooper Brothers & Co., of the five largest accountancy
firms in 1939, not represented. The SCCLR included the current
President (Palmour), two past-Presidents (Freeman, 1925-26,
and Carter, 1936-37) and four others who were to become Presidents of the ICAEW within ten years (Barton, 1944-45; Howitt,
1945-46; Kettle, 1949-50; and Robson, 1952-53). All except
Carter were partners in London firms and all had close and
regular contact with government departments through their
wartime efforts. At least five (including Kettle), in a personal
capacity or as representatives of the ICAEW, had been in administrative or advisory positions providing expert advice or participating in policy-making to the authorities listed in Table 1. The
other three members of the new SCCLR (Freeman, Carter and
Robson), plus Barton, had constituted a sub-committee of the
General Purposes Committee of the Council to prepare the
Memorandum on Excess Profits Tax (EPT) submitted to Sir
Kingsley Wood in March 1942. They also attended, with
Palmour, a meeting with the Chancellor and the Chairman of
the Board of Inland Revenue, Sir Cornelius Gregg (1942-48), to
discuss the memorandum [Ms. 28416/8, pp.85, 103].18 Perhaps
most significant of all is the fact that the new SCCLR included
four (Barton, Howitt, Kettle and Robson) of the six members of
16
Membership is given in Appendix 5 as is their role in the preparation and
publication of the first ten RoAPs.
17
It is likely that the pool of Council members from which the SCCLR could
be selected was restricted by two factors: the need for them to possess appropriate technical skills; and, in wartime conditions, to be readily available to attend
meetings in London. The latter factor, in particular, might have biased the composition of the membership in favour of individuals with the characteristics
described below.
18
Among the membership of the SCCLR, Yeabsley, a partner in Hill,
Vellacott & Co., appears, at first sight, to be the “odd man out”, being on neither
Council nor the P&L Committee and never serving as President of the ICAEW.
Yeabsley’s appointment to the SCCLR probably reflects the P&L Committee’s
desire to include someone having very close connections with the BoT, serving
as an “adviser” to that government department [The Accountant, 15 August 1942,
p.95; see also The Accountant, 29 June 1946, p.364].
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the ICAEW mentioned by government officials as suitable accountants for appointment to the Cohen Committee (Appendix
5). A comparison of the original and newly constituted SCCLR is
also instructive. Of the seven members of the original SCCLR,
three (Carter, Barton and Howitt) joined the new committee and
three others had by then resigned from Council and were therefore ineligible for appointment. The only member of the original
SCCLR not to find a place in the new committee was, therefore,
H. L. H. Hill, President 1931-32 and 1933-34, a known opponent
of the statutory regulation of corporate financial reporting procedures.19
TABLE 1
Governmental Organizations Served by Council Members
During World War II Prior to Their Appointment to the
SCCLR
Member

Government authority

Palmour

Ministry of Labour and National Service (through the Advisory
Council of the National Register)
Ministry of Labour and National Service (through the Accountancy
Committee of the Central Register)

Barton

Ministry of Aircraft Production (through the Authorized Controller of
General Aircraft Ltd.)

Howitt

Air Council
Air Supply Board
Air Training Corps (through the Board of Finance)
NAAFI Council
Building Materials Board
Ministry of Works

Kettle

Treasury

Yeabsley

Central Price Regulation Committee

Ministry of Aircraft Production

BoT in relation to the fixing of prices under the various utility
schemes
Sources: Howitt, 1966, pp.255-256; Garrett, 1961, pp.213-214, 221; Parker, 1980;
Jones, 1981, pp.188, 191-192; Williams and Nicholls, 1981, pp.545-546; Who’s
Who, 1954, p.175; The International Who’s Who, 1956, pp.424, 482, 1024.
19
In his presidential address to the 51st annual general meeting of the
ICAEW, Hill stated that “[t]he Institute has always opposed legislation which
would prescribe in detail the precise form or content of accounts or the duties of
auditors, and, for myself, I am in entire accord with this attitude” [The Accountant, 7 May 1932, p.628].
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It is the duty of organizational collectives to enhance the
position of their members within the market for specialist
skilled labor as demonstrated by, for example, the co-ordination
initiative starting in August 1942. The wartime conditions had
contributed to a situation where the state had expressed (in
December 1942) its determination to strengthen the law “to provide greater publicity” [BT58/356]. It is our understanding that,
in March 1943, the ICAEW’s Council, through its influential
P&L Committee, sought to protect, and possibly enhance, its
members’ dominant position within the labor market by constructing a SCCLR comprised of members who were, on the one
hand, aligned with the BoT’s initiative in reforming company
law as “a real part of the war effort” [Hancock and Gowing,
1949, p.541] and, on the other hand, people with a record of
public service likely to enhance their credibility with the responsible government department. The likely influence of the state
over the P&L Committee’s selection of members of the new
SCCLR, coupled with the appointment of Kettle to the Cohen
Committee by the BoT, indicates that, on reconstitution of the
SCCLR in March 1943, and thus well before the submission of
the ICAEW memorandum to the Cohen Committee, on 25th
February 1944, a corporatist structure is discernible in the relationship between the ICAEW and the BoT. As Schmitter [1979,
p.13] observes, the alignment of the interests of a producer association with those of the state, through control or influence of
the latter over the selection of its leaders, is an important indication of corporatism. It is this influence of the state, represented
by the BoT, over the “articulation of demands” by the ICAEW
that leads us to depart from Bircher [1991] in our assessment of
the dominant factors affecting the development of CA48.
In light of the above, the draft memorandum, dated 25 October 1943, prepared by the SCCLR and submitted to the P&L
Committee,20 unsurprisingly proved sympathetic to the BoT’s
initiative to reform company law. The message conveyed (by
head eight of the synopsis of main observations) is in stark contrast to the submission to the Company Law Amendment Committee in the 1920s, and the stance taken following the revelations of the Royal Mail case in 1931:
The Institute is in favour of the maximum practicable
disclosure of information in annual accounts but is op20
The P&L Committee then submitted the draft memorandum to the Council on 3rd November 1943.
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posed to standardisation of form. It makes a number of
recommendations with respect to the details which
should be disclosed in Balance Sheets and expresses its
views as to the disclosure of inner reserves. It considers
that the time has now arrived when statutory guidance
should be given as to the contents of profit and loss
accounts and indicates the general principles which, in
its opinion, should apply; it also submits a suggestion
which might form the basis of a clause designed to
prescribe the information which should be disclosed
[Ms. 28432/19, emphasis added].
With these words, the Council of the ICAEW revealed its conversion to the notion that general statutory regulation should cover
the substantial content of corporate published accounts.
Bircher and others have observed that the report of the
Cohen Committee, submitted to the BoT in June 1945, was
heavily influenced by the ICAEW memorandum:
Its [the ICAEW] memorandum of evidence was very
detailed, comprehensive and clear, more so than any
other submission. Its evidence amounted to an ambitious but authoritatively informed review of the potential of and need for company law reform. The experience of the ICAEW in issuing its Recommendations,
which the BOT had expressly acknowledged as valuable, established the ICAEW as the only accounting
body with direct experience of regulation. Even without
Kettle’s influence on the [Cohen] Committee, the
ICAEW evidence would have exerted a powerful effect
[Bircher, 1991, p. 260].
The influence of the ICAEW on the accounting provisions of
the report of the Cohen Committee is of course there for all to
see. Many explanatory and analytical sentences or paragraphs in
the “Accounts” section were taken from the ICAEW memorandum. For instance, in paragraph 98, “Function of balance
sheet”, the report cited, verbatim, material contained in the
ICAEW memorandum.21 However, this study is not concerned
with the fact that the Cohen Committee accepted the detailed
21
Specific recommendations, as well as explanatory material, can be traced
to the ICAEW memorandum. For example, the proposed definition of fixed and
current assets and almost all the recommended disclosure items originated in
the ICAEW memorandum. Bircher [1991, p.263] adds that the direct influence
of the ICAEW memorandum can also be found in the recommendations of the
Cohen Committee on the disclosure of the foreign exchange conversion method
and the pre-acquisition profits and losses of subsidiary companies.
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accounting recommendations contained in the ICAEW’s submission;22 its purposes are to explain why the substance of the
ICAEW submission favored the introduction of general statutory
regulation, and to demonstrate how the content of its submission then controlled the content of RoAPs 6-10. We have shown
that the composition of the SCCLR was a significant factor in
building a corporatist structure with the state and undoubtedly
contributed towards enhancing the acceptability of the ICAEW
memorandum. Further, it is our view that Kettle’s position as
the only accountant on the Cohen Committee made acceptance
of the ICAEW memorandum more secure. Indeed, the BoT’s
internal documents reveal that, in preparing the report of the
Cohen Committee, Kettle played the leading role in drafting the
accounting recommendations [BT58/374].
In the next section, we consider how support was engineered from the general body of members for this transformation in the ICAEW Council’s fundamental attitude towards compulsory disclosure by legislation.
A HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE
We have seen that Williamson [1989, p.75] asserts that a
producer association, striving to achieve a corporatist relationship with the state, will be characterized by a bureaucratically
hierarchical structure “under the dominant influence of the
leadership rather than responsive to membership demands”.
The following features of the structural arrangements made by
the Council of the ICAEW for the purpose of gathering comments on its draft proposals when formulating the memorandum for submission to the Cohen Committee are relevant in this
context.
First, members were required to submit recommendations
to the Council through a formal process involving their district
societies. The limitation which this placed on the ability of individual members to make their views known suffered further
22
Their successful opposition to calls for the standardization of accounts,
from for example The Economist, might well be interpreted as indicating the fact
that the leaders of the ICAEW were actively seeking to “mold” the detail, rather
than the overall aim, of the provisions of CA47 and CA48. We acknowledge this
possibility and suggest that the behavior of the ICAEW, in seeking to mold the
detail of new accounting regulations, should be understood through a corporatist concept – private interest government – whereby producer associations take
on a quasi-public status of self-regulation, on behalf of the state, in order to
protect themselves against direct state intervention [Streeck and Schmitter,
1985, pp.19-20].

Published by eGrove, 2004

23

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 31 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 4
76

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2004

restriction because, except for the London and District Society,
there existed no automatic right to membership of a local society. The membership of district societies depended on the willingness of chartered accountants to pay an additional subscription and was generally quite low.23 It is therefore uncertain
whether the committees of the district societies truly represented the opinion of the general body of members.
Second, the lack of cross-sectional communication between
district societies. Information submitted by each society was
collected and collated by the Council, but the accumulated data
were not remitted to the district societies. Submitted opinions
were circulated only amongst members of the SCCLR [Ms.
28411/13, p.55]. Even individual members of the Council appear
not to have been fully informed of the entire balance of opinions.
The Council circulated its draft memorandum to district
societies for comment on 4th August 1943 [Ms. 28411/13, p.55].
Most historical records relating to this aspect of our study have
been destroyed, and it is therefore impossible to be fully informed about how the contents of the memorandum were received. Certainly, there is no evidence of any serious challenge
from the membership to the fundamental shift in favor of compulsory disclosure embodied in the ICAEW memorandum. Indeed, some district society committees, such as London and
Liverpool, actively supported the recommendations made. The
Liverpool Society specifically suggested that the ICAEW memorandum should incorporate RoAPs already published [Ms.
28432/19].
Nonetheless, some dissatisfaction smoldered at district level
concerning certain proposals made, to which the above structural arrangements were effectively applied to delimit the opportunity for members to oppose the Council’s decision. The committee of the Leicestershire and Northamptonshire Society, for
example, complained to the Council that its recommendation on
the abuse of majority rights in private companies had not surfaced in the ICAEW memorandum and inquired whether there
would be any objection to it “communicating direct with the
Chairman or Secretary to the Cohen Committee on that point?”
[Ms. 28432/19]. The Council replied that it did not “see its way
to make further representations” [Ms. 28420/3, p.238] and, significantly, added that the Council was of the “opinion that sepa23

It varied from 18.4% to 53.4% of the membership of individual societies
and averaged 29% overall [Ms. 28432/19].
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rate representations by any District Society would be inappropriate” [Ms. 28420/3, p.238]. A further letter from the Sheffield
Society, dated 24 August 1944, requested the Council to withdraw its recommendation on Section 133 (1) (b) of CA29.24 Rejecting this request, the Council replied that “it is perhaps not to
be expected that suggestions which found favour with certain
districts or members would appeal equally to other persons considering them” [Ms. 28420/3, p.242]. The ability of individual
societies to press their case suffered from a lack of knowledge of
the views of the others. Council ensured monopoly control over
available information25 – the second hierarchical feature noted
above – and this effectively forced each district society to accept
the choices that it made.
We can therefore conclude that this delimitation of “the
opportunities for the members to oppose decisions taken by the
leadership” [Williamson, 1989, p.208], by restricting the communication route and controlling the flow of information within
the organization, contributed a key institutional trait central to
the successful creation of a corporatist structure.
FORMATION AND OPERATION OF THE GASC
The ICAEW’s Taxation and Financial Relations (T&FR)
Committee was formed on 11th June 1942. The job of drafting
RoAPs for approval by Council was delegated to the General
Advisory Sub-Committee (GASC) which was created during the
first meeting of the T&FR Committee held on 22nd July 1942.
The terms of reference established for the GASC included the
requirement “to consider, inter-alia, general questions of accounting principles and procedure and any other matters of mutual interest to practising and non-practising members” [Ms.
28423, p.11, emphasis added]. We can therefore see that the
GASC was created to improve liaison between practising and
24
Section 133 (1) (b) provided, in the case of private companies, an exception to the general rule that officers or employees should not serve as auditor.
The ICAEW memorandum in this connection recommended that “the exception
in the case of private companies as set out in Section 133 (1) (b) should be
withdrawn as being wrong in principle. It also suggests that not only every
officer but also every employee of a company should be ineligible for appointment as its auditor” [Ms. 28432/19].
25
A formal mechanism for district societies to exchange information and
ideas had been dismantled, as early as 1937, as the result of the Council’s decision to suspend the annual meeting between representatives of the Council and
the committees of each district society [The Accountant, 30 October 1937,
p.582].
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non-practising members, while its most famous output, the series of RoAPs, was launched in response to the requests for
guidance “constantly stressed especially by its industrial members” [Ms. 28432/19] such as F. R. M. de Paula and P. M. Rees,
who held full-time posts in industry or commerce. Bircher
[1991, p.239] rightly emphasizes the significance of “the generative ferment”, that existed within the drafting sub-committee of
the GASC consisting of de Paula26 and Rees, together with K. A.
Layton-Bennett, in persuading the Council to issue RoAPs. This
part of our study shows, however, that practitioners in highly
influential positions on the P&L Committee and the Council –
Barton, Howitt and Kettle - played a crucial role in achieving
approval from the Council for RoAPs.
The GASC’s initial drafts of RoAPs 1 and 2 were received by
the P&L Committee on 23rd November 1942 and then referred
to its own drafting committee consisting of Barton, Howitt and
Kettle [Ms. 28420/3, p.191]. Given the standing of these three
practitioners within the ICAEW’s Council, it seems almost certain that they were in a position to decide the success or otherwise of the RoAP programme.27 The minutes of a meeting of the
Council held on 2nd December 1942 report the following decision: “the Memorandum prepared by the Taxation and Financial
Relations Committee be approved as amended” [Ms. 28411/12,
p.384]. RoAPs 1 and 2 were issued on 12th December 1942 and
three further RoAPs, created in a similar manner, were published on 13th March 1943 [Ms. 28420/3, p.199; Ms. 28423,
p.21]. The Accountant records that the first five RoAPs dealt
with technically difficult and intricate matters “of the most fundamental importance while yet being amongst those which have
occasioned the most varied discussions in the business and professional world” [The Accountant, 20 March 1943, p.145], specifically the treatment in accounts of taxation in general, and
Excess Profits Tax in particular. A few months later, Rees pub26
de Paula chaired the T&FR Committee meetings from the spring of 1943
through to 1945. Kitchen and Parker [1980, p.111] point to the fact that “the
subjects of the Recommendations (nos. VI to X) published between October
1943 and June 1945 followed exactly the list of subjects identified by de Paula in
his 1933 Preface to Principles of Auditing”.
27
The typical operational procedure of the T&FR Committee in drafting
technical documents, particularly the drafting of RoAPs, is explained by Zeff
[1972, pp.11-12]. The essence of the procedure saw the Council taking a great
deal of trouble to maintain control over the drafting of technical documents by
the T&FR Committee. In practice, such control was exercised through the P&L
Committee [P&L Committee Minutes Book G, pp.96-97].
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licly observed that these were “matters which were particularly
urgent” [The Accountant, 7 August 1943, p.75].
The series of RoAPs then moved on to a new phase; the
planned role of RoAPs, commencing with Recommendation 6,
was expanded to deal with more general financial reporting issues. Bircher [1991, pp.238-241] acknowledges the qualitative
change that occurred with the second five RoAPs issued, but he
does not explain why this happened. Below, we address this
issue and locate it within our corporatist analysis.
The minutes of a meeting of the GASC, held on 12th March
1943, state:
It was decided that the next subjects for consideration
should be (a) Reserves, including Undisclosed Reserves,
(b) Stock in Trade and (c) Depreciation; and that Reserves should be proceeded with at once. The Secretary
was requested to invite the members of the Sub-Committee [GASC] and the Regional [T&FR] Committees to
submit their suggestions by 30th March . . . It was decided to write to the Parliamentary and Law Committee
. . . informing them that the Sub-Committee [GASC]
proposes to deal in order with the points arising on
looking at a published Balance Sheet and to ask if the
Committee has any comments to make; in particular
whether the Sub-Committee [GASC] shall put forward
any draft recommendations on Subsidiary and Subsubsidiary Companies [GASC Minutes Book A, p.7].
The P&L Committee, at a meeting held on 24th May 1943, approved “in principle the Programme and suggest that the “Form
of Disclosure of the Results of Subsidiary Companies” should
also be a matter for their consideration” [Ms. 28420/3, pp.208209].
In developing this new direction for RoAPs, and preparing
drafts for submission to the P&L Committee, two industrial
members of the GASC, de Paula and Rees, again seem to have
played an important role.28 The P&L Committee’s approval of
28
de Paula, Rees and H. J. Page comprised the sub-committee appointed to
draft RoAP 6, entitled “Reserves and Provisions” (issued 23 October 1943) (Appendix 5). Rees and de Paula also undertook to produce initial drafts of RoAP 7
(issued 12 February 1944) and RoAP 8 (issued 15 July 1944) [GASC Minutes
Book A, pp.9, 11-12]. Rees further undertook to prepare preliminary and revised
drafts of RoAP 9 (issued 12 January 1945) and RoAP 10 (issued 15 June 1945)
[GASC Minutes Book A, pp.21-22, 25-26]. When the P&L Committee met to
consider draft RoAP 6, on 18th October 1943, de Paula and Rees attended as
representatives of the T&FR Committee [Ms. 28420/3, p.220].
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the outputs from the new “Programme”, which proved forthcoming, was a necessary precondition for ensuring that the
GASC’s initiative, in shifting the direction of RoAPs, would receive Council’s approval. Given their commitment to, and close
involvement in, the creation of the first five RoAPs, we conclude
that Barton, Howitt and Kettle continued to be influential supporters of the GASC’s initiative on the P&L Committee and, in
due course, the Council.
The minutes of a meeting of the P&L Committee held on
29th March 1943 begin to shed light on the factors that led to
the GASC’s initiative:
A letter dated the 16th March, 1943, from the Secretary
of the Taxation and Financial Relations Committee was
considered, asking whether the Sub-Committee set up
in 1935 to consider amendments to the Companies Act
[SCCLR] desire points brought to the attention of the
Regional [T&FR] Committees to be referred to the SubCommittee [SCCLR] [Ms. 28420/3, pp.205-206].
The coincidence of the timing between the decision to take
RoAPs in a new direction (12th March 1943) and the offer of
assistance to the SCCLR (16th March 1943) imply that the
GASC resolved to initiate a change in the nature of RoAPs in
response to the preparations being made at the BoT for a new
inquiry into company law, that is, the formation of the Cohen
Committee which had been in progress within the BoT since
December 1942. There is no definitive evidence to support this
hypothesis, but the chronology of events (Appendix 2) and the
evidence uncovered by this study cause us to conclude that the
qualitative change in RoAPs was prompted by the desire of the
ICAEW to align itself with the priorities of the BoT in relation to
the working of the Cohen Committee.
In accepting the offer of assistance from the GASC, the P&L
Committee, as noted earlier, revived and reconstituted the
SCCLR [Ms. 28420/3, p.206], with Barton, Howitt and Kettle,
who we have argued were key supporters for the GASC’s initiative, amongst its membership (Appendix 5). These three, relatively younger practitioners29 were likely to find radical change
acceptable, as demonstrated by their earlier nomination, by gov29
The age of each member of the reconstituted SCCLR, as at March 1943,
was as follows: Palmour, 65; Barton, 60; Freeman, 68; Carter, 73; Howitt, 56;
Kettle, 55; Robson, 46; Yeabsley, 44; Binder, 66 (average 59.2 years) (Appendix
5). The average age of the members of the P&L Committee, as at March 1943,
was 64.3.
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ernment officials, as suitable appointees to the Cohen Committee. The GASC’s affiliation with the new SCCLR was strengthened by the co-option of Rees,30 who had been elected Chairman
of the GASC in April 1943, to the SCCLR in July 1943, and the
appointment of Rowland, Secretary of the T&FR Committee, as
Secretary of the SCCLR in June 1943 [Ms. 28420/3, pp.212, 216]
(Appendix 5). RoAPs were now interlocked, through the affiliation between the new SCCLR and the GASC, with the ICAEW
memorandum to be submitted to the Cohen Committee. Rees,
together with Barton and Robson, then formed the sub-committee appointed to settle the content of the ICAEW memorandum
which was presented to the Cohen Committee by Howitt and
Robson. The structure and relationships between the BoT, the
Cohen Committee, the Council of the ICAEW, the P&L Committee, the T&FR Committee, the GASC, the SCCLR, RoAPs and the
ICAEW memorandum are summarized in Exhibit 1.
There is sufficient explicit evidence to support our contention that the new programme of RoAPs was dominated by concerns amongst the ICAEW leadership over its acceptability to
the state. At a meeting of the GASC held on 19th August 1943,
before any of the five more wide-ranging RoAPs (6-10) were
issued, Rees “explained the importance of avoiding any conflict
between the Recommendations and evidence to be tendered by
the Institute to the official Committee on Company Law Amendment” [Ms. 28423, p.38]. This comment, consistent with further
evidence presented below, indicates that the composition of
RoAPs 6-10 was purposely designed to accord with the content
of the ICAEW memorandum.
The intertwining of RoAPs with the ICAEW memorandum
led to the P&L Committee intensifying its control over the
GASC’s drafting activities. In particular, the P&L Committee
was cautious about proceeding with the publication of further
RoAPs on the grounds that it could result in possible conflict
with the conclusions that might be reached by the recently appointed Cohen Committee [Ms. 28420/3, p.212].31 The Council
30
Rees appears to have been particularly influential in drafting the content
of the first ten RoAPs. At the P&L Committee meeting, held on 28th May 1945, a
“vote of thanks was passed to Mr. P. M. Rees for his work in connection with the
whole series of recommendations” [Ms. 28420/3, p.247].
31
The leaders of the ICAEW showed less caution, and foresight, 30 years
later (May 1974) in issuing Provisional Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 7, entitled “Current Purchasing Power Accounting”, despite the
government’s prior appointment of a Committee of Enquiry (January 1974)
[Tweedie and Whittington, 1984, pp.81-82]. The Sandilands Committee’s

Published by eGrove, 2004

29

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 31 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 4
82

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2004

EXHIBIT 1
Structure and Relationships among the BoT, the Cohen
Committee, the Council of the ICAEW, the P&L Committee,
the T&FR Committee, the GASC, the SCCLR, RoAPs and
the ICAEW Memorandum

The BoT

The Cohen Committee

The SCCLR

The P&L Committee

The Council of the ICAEW

The GASC

The T&FR Committee

appointment
report
provision of information and assistance (including the co-option of Rees and
the appointment of Rowland as Secretary)
submission of the ICAEW memorandum
publication of RoAPs
approvals of the reports

strident criticism of CPP did much to undermine the reputation of the Accounting Standards Committee.
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instructed Palmour to approach the BoT in order to seek the
views of its President and those of the Chairman of the Cohen
Committee on the publication of RoAPs [Ms. 28411/13, pp.5455]. The reply from Hodgson, and how it was interpreted by the
P&L Committee, is summarized in the following extract from
the Committee’s minutes:
[Hodgson] expressed his satisfaction that the Institute
had approached the Board of Trade on the matter, and
stated that the Departmental view on the matter is that
the balance of advantage is strongly against any suspension of the beneficial service which the work of the
Institute is providing for the business and professional
communities. The [P&L] Committee decided to continue publication [Ms. 28420/3, p.218].32
The decision of the Council to seek the sanction of the BoT
for further publication of RoAPs clearly shows that the Council
actively intended to align its action, in publishing the second
five RoAPs, with the BoT’s initiative to reform company law.
Given the highly positive response from Hodgson, the Council
could now be reasonably confident that the conclusions of the
Cohen Committee would be consistent with its own pronouncements.
CONCLUSION
Researchers into developments within the accountancy profession have drawn on the corporatist model as an insightful
mechanism for analyzing the dialectical relationship with the
state.
Cooper et al [1989, p.254] have argued that:
In return for the monopolisation of audit services and
the advantages of self regulation, the accounting profession is expected to both act in the interests of the state
and control the membership of the profession to act in
those interests.
They continue:
the accounting profession, in the form of its central
organisations such as the Councils of the six major accounting institutes, the Consultative Committee of Ac32
Members of the Council (Barton, S. R. Cooper, Howitt and Robson) then
met representatives of the T&FR Committee to discuss the publication of RoAP
6 and further RoAPs [Ms. 28420/3, p.216].
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counting Bodies (CCAB) and its sub-committees (notably the Accounting Standards Committee), take considerable care to try to identify (and influence) the interests of the state. This takes the form of state
representation on the Accounting Standards Committee, formal and informal discussions with the civil service in relevant departments and regulatory bodies, the
movement of personnel into and out of the respective
organisations and of course the general socialisation
process prevalent in British Society.
The analytical framework of the corporatist model has been
shown by other writers to provide a useful basis for understanding relationships between the accounting profession and the
state. Walker and Shackleton’s [1995, p.474] study of initiatives
designed to achieve state recognition of a unified accountancy
profession between 1930-57, and particularly during the 1940s,
rehearses the outcomes that can be expected from the successful
pursuit of corporatist arrangements with the state:
Governing institutions enter into interdependent and
co-operative relationships with government, have functional responsibilities bestowed upon them, are rewarded with preferential access to policy makers, and
thereby become an integral part of the extended state.
In this paper we have followed Walker and Shackleton
[1995] in applying corporatist analysis to understand events occurring in wartime conditions,33 with the state at that time making arrangements to fulfill its part of the “implied contract between Government and people” [Hancock and Gowing, 1949,
p.541]. During the process of setting up the Cohen Committee,
prominent references were made by state bureaucrats to the
need “to provide better safeguards for the investor, the shareholder and the public interest, and greater publicity in regard to
the formation and affairs of a limited liability company”, while
particular mention was made of the need to protect the interests
of the “small investor, whose numbers are now legion”. Fully
aware of the BoT’s determination to enhance significantly the
level of statutory disclosure in the accounts of limited liability
companies, the ICAEW’s P&L Committee appointed a committee (the reconstituted SCCLR) responsible for drafting the
memorandum for submission to Cohen comprising individuals

33
For their analysis, Walker and Shackleton [1995] draw more heavily on
the British variety of corporatism, “corporate bias”.
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who had (i) previously cooperated successfully with state officials on a range of issues and (ii) been identified by government
officials as suitable accountants for appointment to the Cohen
Committee.
We find evidence of further action taken by the ICAEW’s
leadership to organize affairs and control the actions of members so as to align its interests and outputs with state priorities.
In particular:
1. the district societies were marginalized through the
Council’s rejection of unwelcome proposals, by maintaining monopoly control over available information and by
refusing them the opportunity of making independent
submissions to Cohen;
2. the affiliation between the SCCLR and the GASC ensured
that RoAPs 6-10 were consistent with the content of the
submission to Cohen;
3. the Council, through the P&L Committee, maintained a
firm grip on the work of the GASC, where industrial accountants were prominent, through the drafting responsibilities of three practitioners, Barton, Howitt and Kettle,
who were also members of the SCCLR;
4. Howitt and Robson were the two members of the ICAEW
who gave evidence before Cohen; and
5. Kettle34 was selected by the state to serve as the accounting profession’s representative on the Cohen Committee
and, together with Robson, subsequently served as the
BoT’s “advisers in the drafting and during the passage of
the Companies Bill”.
Pointing to the dominant influence of the ICAEW memorandum over the accounting content of the Cohen Committee’s
Report and thus CA48, Bircher [1991, p.293] asserts that “[t]he
form and content of CA48 owes much to the ICAEW’s development of its reform programme and the exercise of its influence
to mould the legislation in the form of its own programme”. He
continues:
The ICAEW’s actions were to be very influential and the
CA48 provisions cannot be appreciated without an understanding of the centrality of the ICAEW role. Yet
those actions also have to be related to their generative
34
Kettle authored a series of articles published in The Accountant [25 October 1947, pp.258-259; 1 November 1947, pp.274-275; 8 November 1947, pp.294295; 15 November 1947, pp.306-307; 22 November 1947, pp.323-324, 335] entitled “The accounts and audit provisions of the Companies Act”.
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context. The relationship between action and generative
context however is a contingent one, for the response of
the ICAEW to the contextual changes was at least potentially different. There was no unavoidable contextual
imperative for the ICAEW to act as it did and the CA48
therefore represents the consequences of the interplay
between the actions that created it and the contingent
generative structure of those actions [Bircher, 1991,
p.297].
The centrality of the ICAEW’s role in reforming company
law is not disputed, while the “generative ferment” created by de
Paula and Rees in the drafting sub-committee of the GASC is
undoubtedly part of the story. However, we differ from Bircher
in terms of recognizing the influence of the state, represented by
the BoT, over the “articulation of demands” [Schmitter, 1979,
p.13; Williamson 1989, p.207] by the leaders of the ICAEW.
Bircher concludes that the ICAEW succeeded in molding “the
legislation in the form of its own programme” (emphasis added),
whereas we have argued that the ICAEW’s programme was directly influenced by, and designed to respond to, the BoT’s initiative.
The Council of the ICAEW had of course recognized the
possibility of company law reform in the 1930s, but reached the
conclusion that voluntary improvement was the preferred way
forward. Even when it became convinced of the need to issue
RoAPs, these documents were initially perceived as fulfilling no
more than an advisory role. This changed when the Council
mounted, in parallel, the co-ordination initiative and became
aware of the BoT’s determination to achieve radical new company legislation. It is fair to say that the ICAEW was the leading
professional accounting association at this time – certainly in
terms of size, responsibility for company audits, and degree of
involvement in state matters – and it was keen to protect and
enhance this dominant position. It therefore sought to create an
agenda for reform that would meet with state approval, one that
was consistent with the more generalist RoAPs that it now proceeded to issue and for which, following correspondence with
Hodgson at the BoT, it could be reasonably confident of obtaining support.
It is true that the creation of a particular form of corporatist
structure is dependent upon specific historical circumstances,
but once producer associations become part of a corporatist
structure their behavior is generally constrained by the emergence of a relationship within which the interests of the state
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss2/4
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inevitably prevail. In contrast to Bircher’s interpretation that
there was no “unavoidable contextual imperative” for the
ICAEW to act as it did in developing its reform programme and
exercising its influence, the conclusion of this study is that the
ICAEW, when drafting both its memorandum for submission to
the Cohen Committee and the second five RoAPs, functioned
within a structure where the interests of the BoT inevitably prevailed.
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APPENDIX 1
Titles and Publication of RoAPs
RoAP No. Publication
1
2
3
4

12/12/1942
12/12/1942
13/03/1943
13/03/1943

5

13/03/1943

6
7

23/10/1943
12/02/1944

8
9
10
11
12
13

15/07/1944
12/01/1945
15/06/1945
19/07/1946
14/01/1949
11/03/1949

14

12/08/1949

15

30/05/1952

16

13/11/1953

17
18

18/10/1957
10/1958

19
20

10/1958
13/11/1958

21
22

29/02/1960
16/11/1960

23
24
25

02/1965
03/1967
02/1968

26

05/1968

27
28
29

07/1968
08/1968
11/1969

Titles
Tax Reserve Certificates
War Damage Contributions, Premiums and Claims
The Treatment of Taxation in Accounts
The Treatment in Accounts of Income Tax deductible
from Dividends payable and Annual Charges
The Inclusion in Accounts of Proposed Profit Appropriations
Reserves and Provisions
Disclosure of the Financial Position and Results of
Subsidiary Companies in the Accounts of Holding
Companies
Form of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account
Depreciation of Fixed Assets
The Valuation of Stock-in-Trade
Excess Profits Tax Post-war Refunds
Rising Price Levels in relation to Accounts
Accountants’ Reports for Prospectuses: fixed assets
and depreciation
The Form and Contents of Accounts of Estates of
Deceased Persons and Similar Trusts
Accounting in relation to Changes in the Purchasing
Power of Money
Accountants’ Reports for Prospectuses: adjustments
and other matters
Events occurring after the Balance Sheet Date
Presentation of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss
Account
Treatment of Income Tax in Accounts of Companies
Treatment of Investments in the Balance Sheets of
Trading Companies
Retirement Benefits
Treatment of Stock-in-Trade and Work in Progress in
Financial Accounts
Hire-purchase, Credit Sale and Rental Transactions
Accounting Treatment of Investment Grants
Accounting Treatment of Major Changes in the
Sterling Parity of Overseas Currencies
The Land Commission Act 1967: accounting implications
Treatment of Taxation in Accounts of Companies
Accounts of Investment Trust Companies
Trust Accounts

Source: ICAEW [1961].
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APPENDIX 2
Chronology of Key Events
Event
Appointment of the original SCCLR by the P&L Committee
Submission to the P&L Committee by the SCCLR of its report
Outbreak of World War II
Formation of the T&FR Committee
The first meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee
Formation of the GASC by the T&FR Committee
Representatives of ICAEW meet with Jowitt to discuss
post-war reconstruction
Palmour’s introduction of the alleged statement by Jowitt
that “the Accountancy bodies should get together”
The start of the drafting work of the Co-ordinating
Committee to establish the Public Accountants’ Bill
Publication of RoAPs 1 and 2 by the Council
Hodgson’s submission to Dalton of his original idea to
reform company law
fforde’s nomination of suitable accountant members on
the Cohen Committee
Dalton’s determination to reform company law
GASC’s resolution to develop a new direction for RoAPs 6-10
Publication of RoAPs 3-5 by the Council
GASC’s communication to the P&L Committee to offer
assistance to the SCCLR
Reconstitution of the SCCLR by the P&L Committee and
acceptance of the offer of assistance by the GASC
GASC’s communication to the P&L Committee on the
new direction for RoAPs 6-10
Kingsley Wood’s recommendation of Kettle to serve on the
Cohen Committee
P&L Committee’s approval of the new direction for RoAPs 6-10
Appointment of the Cohen Committee
P& L Committee’s recommendation to postpone the
publication of RoAP 6
Council’s decision to approach the BoT for their view on
further publication of RoAPs by the ICAEW
Hodgson’s reply to the approach made by the ICAEW
Publication of RoAP 6 by the Council
Submission of the draft memorandum by the SCCLR to
the P&L Committee
Submission of the draft memorandum by the P&L
Committee to the Council
Publication of RoAP 7 by the Council
Submission of the ICAEW Memorandum by the
Council to the Cohen Committee
Publication of RoAP 8 by the Council
Publication of RoAP 9 by the Council
Publication of RoAP 10 by the Council
Submission to the BoT by the Cohen Committee of its report
Introduction of Companies Bill, 1946 to Parliament
Enactment of CA47
Consolidation of CA48
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Date
23 January 1935
25 July 1938
1 September 1939
11 June 1942
7 August 1942
20 August 1942
24 September 1942
5 October 1942
24 October 1942
12 December 1942
22 December 1942
4 February 1943
15 February 1943
12 March 1943
13 March 1943
16 March 1943
29 March 1943
14 April 1943
15 April 1943
24 May 1943
26 June 1943
30 June 1943
4 August 1943
7 September 1943
23 October 1943
25 October 1943
3 November 1943
12 February 1944
25 February 1944
15 July 1944
12 January 1945
15 June 1945
June 1945
June 1947
6 August 1947
30 June 1948
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APPENDIX 3
Relevant Government Officials and Their Position
Name
Hugh Dalton
Sir Arnold Overton
Sir Edward Hodgson
J. G. Henderson
Sir William Jowitt
Sir Kingsley Wood
Arthur F. B. fforde
Sir Cornelius Gregg

Position
President of the BoT (1942-45)
Permanent Secretary of the BoT
Second Secretary of the BoT
Principal of the Companies Department of the BoT
Minister for Reconstruction (1942-44)
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1940-43)
Deputy Director of Contracts at the Ministry of Supply
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (1942-48)

Source: Ms. 28423; BT58/356; Bircher [1991].

APPENDIX 4
Membership of the P&L Committee as of 29th March 1943
Name
C. J. G. Palmour
(President)
H. M. Barton
(Vice-President)
W. S. Carrington

Firms
Whinney, Smith & Whinney
and Whinney, Smethurst & Co.
Barton, Mayhew & Co.

Whinney, Smith & Whinney
and Whinney, Smethurst & Co.
R. N. Carter (1936-37)*
Carter, Chaloner & Kearns,
W. Charlesworth & Co. and
Carter, Chaloner & Meggison
L. W. Farrow
Sissons, Bersey, Gain, Vincent & Co.
C. E. Fletcher
Cooper Brothers & Co.
G. R. Freeman (1925-26)* Gane, Jackson, Jefferys & Freeman
H. L. H. Hill (1931-32
Hill, Vellacott & Co. and Hill,
and 1933-34)*
Vellacott & Bailey
Sir Harold Howitt
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Russell Kettle
Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co.
Harold M. Moore
Edward Moore & Sons
Herbert J. Page
Hudson Smith, Briggs & Co., Kemp,
Chatteris, Nichols, Sendell & Co. and
Fisher, Randle, Kemp, Sendell & Co.
The Lord Plender
Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co.
(1910-12 and 1929-30)*
T. Walton
Walton, Watts & Co.
Sir Nicholas Waterhouse Price Waterhouse & Co.
(1928-29)*

Location
London
London
London
Manchester

London
London
London
London
London
London
London
London

London
Manchester
London

* after the name indicates that members concerned were past Presidents and
years in parentheses indicate the years of presidency.
Source: Ms. 28420/3.
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Member of the P&L
Committee responsible for
drafting RoAPs 1-5
Member of the P&L
Committee responsible for
drafting RoAPs 1-5

newly appointed member in
March 1943

newly appointed member in
March 1943 (not a member of
the P&L Committee, but so
from July 1943)

Russell Kettle*# (55)

T. B. Robson* (46)

Member of the P&L
Committee responsible for
drafting RoAPs 3-5

Member of the P&L
Committee responsible for
drafting RoAPs 1-5

member of original SCCLR

ex-officio member, as
Chairman of the P&L
Committee

G. R. Freeman# (68)
(Chairman of the P&L
Committee)

Chairman (July.1942Mar.1943) of the T&FR
Committee

member of original SCCLR

ex-officio member, as VicePresident (also, member of
original SCCLR)

H. M. Barton*# (60) (VicePresident)

Role in preparation and
publication of the first five
RoAPs (1-5)

R. N. Carter# (73)

ex-officio member, as
President

C. J. G. Palmour# (65)
(President)

Principal Members (including
Secretary) of the GASC of the
T&FR Committee (dates in
parenthesis)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss2/4
Member of the P&L Committee responsible for RoAPs
6-10 (and drafting Cohen
Committee Memorandum)

Member of the P&L Committee responsible for RoAPs
6-10 (and drafting Cohen
Committee Memorandum)

Member of the P&L Committee responsible for RoAPs
6-10 (and drafting Cohen
Committee Memorandum)

Role in preparation and
publication of the second five
RoAPs (6-10)

94

Sir Harold Howitt*# (56)

Status of each member within
the reconstituted SCCLR

Membership of the reconstituted SCCLR, March 1943
(age in parenthesis)

Members of the Reconstituted SCCLR and Their Role in Preparation and
Publication of the First Ten RoAPs
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newly appointed member in
March 1943 (neither a
member of the Council nor of
the P&L Committee)

member appointed to replace
Kettle when the latter was
appointed to the Cohen
Committee (not a member of
the P&L Committee)

appointed Secretary of the
reconstituted SCCLR in June
1943

co-opted member from the
GASC in July 1943

R. E. Yeabsley (44)

B.H. Binder (66)

S.W. Rowland (Secretary)
(c.55)

P.M. Rees (59)

Published by eGrove, 2004
Role in preparation and
publication of the second five
RoAPs (6-10)

Participated in drafting RoAPs
K. A. Layton-Bennett (53), as
Chairman (Apr.1943-Oct.1943) 1-5 when Chairman of the
GASC
of the T&FR Committee and
Chairman (Aug.1942Mar.1943) of the GASC

Participated in drafting
RoAPs 6-8 when ViceChairman of the T&FR
Committee

Participated in drafting RoAPs Participated in drafting
1-5 when Vice-Chairman of
RoAPs 6-10 when Chairman
of the GASC
the GASC

Participated in drafting RoAPs Participated in drafting
1-5 when Secretary of the
RoAPs 6-10 when Secretary
of the T&FR Committee
T&FR Committee

Role in preparation and
publication of the first five
RoAPs (1-5)

F. R. M. de Paula (60), as Vice- Participated in drafting RoAPs
1-5 when Vice-Chairman of
Chairman (July.1942the T&FR Committee
Oct.1943) and Chairman
(Nov.1943 -) ofthe T&FR
Committee

Vice-Chairman (Aug.1942Mar.1943) and Chairman
(Apr.1943 -) of the GASC

Secretary of the T&FR
Committee

Principal Members (including
Secretary) of the GASC of the
T&FR Committee (dates in
parenthesis)

Noguchi and Edwards: Corporatism and Unavoidable Imperatives

* after the name indicates that members concerned were recommended, as suitable, for appointment to the Cohen Committee.
# after the name indicates that members concerned were members of the P&L Committee as at March 1943.
Source: Ms. 28420/3; Ms. 28423; GASC Minutes Book A; BT58/356.

Status of each member within
the reconstituted SCCLR

Membership of the reconstituted SCCLR, March 1943
(age in parenthesis)
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